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I N T E R N A T I O N A L
Hard choices on 
Myanmar still lie ahead 
for the EU
The EU has acted swiftly in lifting its sanctions to 
encourage Myanmar’s demonstration. But Clara Portela 
points to the difﬁculties Brussels has yet to encounter
M
yanmar’s sweeping reforms have forced the EU to 
reformulate its policies towards the country. For 20 years, 
EU policy has consisted of designing sanctions against 
the ruling military junta, while its assistance has been 
limited to little more than health, education and refugee issues. 
Now, almost overnight, the EU has had to face the challenge of 
helping to consolidate the reform process while addressing a fast-
moving and highly complex situation there.
The EU’s condemnation of Myanmar’s leadership stemmed 
from the military junta’s failure to honour the outcome of the 1990 
parliamentary elections which had seen a landslide victory for the 
main opposition party, the National League of Democracy (NLD) 
headed by Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta seized power in 1962, 
but it was only in 1990 that sanctions were imposed in conjunction 
with the U.S. and such others as Australia and Canada. Preferential 
EU access for Burmese products under the Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP) was withdrawn in 1997. The often-heard 
argument that sanctions were not working rested on the assumption 
that their primary objective was to alter the junta’s policies. In 
essence, though, the sanctions were the result of a balancing act 
between the need to assuage public outrage in Europe over human 
rights scandals, persistent lobbying by exiles and diaspora groups 
and a desire to protect European business interests, notably in the 
extractive sector. The result was a package of so-called ‘targeted 
sanctions’ singling out individual officials to be held responsible 
for violations. The EU, meanwhile, continued to give aid for health 
and education and never banned trade, other than for arms, until 
its 2007 ban on timber, gems and semi-precious stones.
The breakthrough came in 2011 with the inauguration of a 
new Myanmar government composed mostly of nominally civilian 












the country’s new president, Thein Sein. Under his leadership, 
opposition parties and trade unions were legalised, a large number 
of political prisoners released and media censorship abolished. 
Forced labour was banned. Then, in 2012, parliamentary by-
elections brought NLD candidates who included Aung San Suu 
Kyi to parliament. This handover of power by the junta to a new 
leadership had been announced back in a 2004 roadmap, but its 
implementation had so often been postponed by the discredited 
junta that nobody believed it could ever introduce change. Thein 
Sein’s reforms caught the EU and the world by surprise.
The EU response was the obvious steps of lifting the sanctions and 
reinstating the GSP in mid-2013 so that Myanmar now has access to 
the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) regime. The EU more than doubled 
its aid with a wide-ranging package of €150m. Last year it opened 
an EU representative office in Yangon (Rangoon), and this has now 
been upgraded to a Delegation. A succession of visits by the EU’s 
Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, by Catherine Ashton, 
Whether called Burma or Myanmar, the country's emergence from decades of military 
rule presents the West with a dilemma. Europe and the United States are, on the one 
hand, keen to reward its transition to democratic rule – and to ensure they themselves 
gain an economic toehold in a country with such immense natural resources that has 
the potential to emerge as another Asian tiger. Set against that, there are still grave 
concerns over human rights, in particular the treatment of ethnic minorities such as 
the Muslim Rohingyas. Conditions for workers in Burmese mines, building sites and 
factories, including the use of forced labour, remain a real worry.
The European Union's decision in April to lift permanently almost all its sanctions 
on Burma was therefore met with dismay from human rights campaigners. While 
recognising the country's progress since the easing of military rule, Human Rights 
Watch called the lifting of sanctions a "serious mistake" that would remove EU leverage 
over hardliners in the armed forces still engaged in repression of the Rohingyas, 
Kachin or other minorities. European trade unions complained that forced labour 
remains a reality, regardless of commitments by the Burmese government to comply 
with International Labour Organization (ILO) standards.
Despite all these concerns – and differences in approach which saw Germany pressing 
for a rapid normalisation of relations, while Britain urged greater caution – EU foreign 
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the EU’s foreign policy chief, and the Commission’s President Barroso 
have sealed Myanmar’s return to international respectability. Even 
the official name ‘Myanmar’, that was formerly rejected by the EU 
as a way of contesting the junta’s legitimacy, is making its way into 
EU discourse, suggesting a gradual dropping of ‘semantic sanctions’. 
In just two years, the EU has switched from sanctions mode to a co-
operative relationship, compelled to some extent by fatigue with 
its own sanctions regime. The reform process has offered Europe 
an opportunity to change course, even if – strictly speaking – the 
ongoing reforms have not yet amounted to democratisation. The EU is 
rewarding relative progress, which in view of the speed and depth of 
the reforms, has been nothing less than spectacular.
The question is: what comes next? Once the objectives of the 
original 1990 sanctions have been met – the hand-over to a civilian 
government plus ‘progress towards national reconciliation’ – new 
priorities have had to be set. David O’Sullivan, the chief operating 
ministers were unanimous in their decision to drop most sanctions while maintaining 
a long-standing arms embargo. That lifted the asset freeze imposed on almost a 
thousand companies and institutions, together with an embargo on investment in the 
mining, timber and precious metal sectors, and travel bans on hundreds of Burmese 
officials. 
In further moves since then, the EU in July re-admitted Burma to its preferential trade 
regime, granting duty-free and quota-free market access for all products other than 
weapons. The move came in response to the ILO reporting labour rights improvements, 
and should help Myanmar boost modest exports to Europe that in 2012 amounted to 
just €164m, mostly from its garment factories.
The United States has been more cautious. President Barack Obama announced 
in May 2012 that sanctions would be relaxed only gradually, in line with progress 
on political reform. Last November, most exports from the country were authorised, 
but Washington maintains a blacklist banning business with companies linked to 
officials accused of involvement in oppression and corruption. And in August of 
this year, the U.S. extended its prohibition on the import of Burmese gemstones 
because their extraction has been linked to some shady military and business 
figures.  Q




The EU is important, but member states still 
have much to offer Myanmar
American Tobacco and Premier Oil 
to withdraw.
Clara Portela notes that an EU-
Myanmar task force is, in the 
words of the EU Council’s latest 
conclusions, "to offer a high-
level platform to pull together EU 
resources for helping the transition 
move ahead." There is now a 
comprehensive framework for EU 
support under the headings of 
peace, democracy, development 
and trade and engagement with the 
international community. In reality, 
no significant reorientation will be 
needed; corruption is less rampant 
than is often alleged, and mainly 
occurs in the internal bureaucracy. 
Foreign investors are now taking 
a very close look at the Burmese 
market, and the recent award of a 
mobile telecom project was hailed 
as a model of transparency.
Some EU member states may be 
better placed than the EU itself 
to offer programmes like police 
training and even a measure 
of military engagement when 
promoting human rights. The 
British government has suggested 
that the intelligent use of sanctions 
in the case of Myanmar has been 
one of the most effective levers 
in encouraging the regime to 
implement democratic change. It is 
not a view widely shared elsewhere 
in the EU, but now the focus is 




he EU’s policy towards 
Myanmar’s government 
between September 
1988 and the by-
elections of April 2012, 
was ostensibly based on 'targeted' 
sanctions denying development aid 
and discouraging trade, investment 
and tourism. Europe sought in vain 
for assets to freeze, and not only 
targeted senior officials and their 
cronies with visa bans but even their 
children and grandchildren. Yet the 
international community allowed 
Myanmar’s military regime to enjoy 
buoyant revenues from selling its 
natural gas to Thailand, because 
not doing so would damage the 
Thai economy and spark a bitter 
row with practically every major 
bank in South East Asia and China. 
So when the by-elections occasioned 
by the resignation of Myanmar’s 
government ministers posts after the 
November 2010 elections saw the 
National League for Democracy win 
43 of 44 seats, the EU was delighted. 
Brussels suspended sanctions in 
April 2012 for 12 months, and lifted 
them altogether this year. Those 
sanctions, as Clara Portela rightly 
observes, reflected international 
outrage over human rights abuses 
in Myanmar, for EU investment 
interests had chiefly been limited 
to French energy giant Total's stake 
in the Yadana natural gas project. 
Pressure by EU governments, 
notably that of the UK, had inhibited 
European corporate involvement 
in the Burmese market, and even 










officer, or No 3, of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
the EU’s “diplomatic service”, announced at the start of 2013 that 
the EU's aim is “to deepen support for the political reform process 
underway”, hinting at “EU support in the area of ethnic peace” 
as an avenue. In April of this year, the European Council listed 
such “concerns” as the release of all remaining political prisoners, 
an end to inter-communal violence and the humanitarian risks 
still faced by the Rohingya. The adoption of a ‘Comprehensive 
Framework’ for EU support to Myanmar followed in July.
What the EU now needs to do to be seen as relevant by all the 
political and societal forces in Myanmar is to help them address 
their most pressing problems – and to be seen to be doing so. 
Inter-communal violence is a major challenge. Anti-Muslim raids 
have of late left hundreds of Muslims killed and their places of 
worship destroyed. The relaxation of the Junta’s restrictions has 
had the undesirable effect of unleashing the sectarian hatreds that 
autocratic rule kept in check. The EU is aware of this, and the 
European Parliament has deplored “the failure of the government 
to protect the Rohingya from organised violence.” Meanwhile, 
another daunting challenge is the long-standing ethnic rebellions: 
although the current government has put ceasefires in place with 
most of the armed groups, a lasting political solution still needs to 
be agreed. 
The EU has never been better placed to help address Myanmar’s 
most immediate problems. It currently enjoys more flexibility in 
Myanmar than the U.S. because the EU sanctions have been 
modified by unanimous decision of the Council, whereas in the U.S. 
system some sanctions are passed by the Congress and others are 
decided by the President. The Obama administration dropped those 
sanctions that were in its power, but many restrictions remain in the 
less flexible hands of the Congress. The EU therefore faces fewer 
constraints than the U.S. in its policies towards Myanmar and in the 
area of peace support has promised to fund the Myanmar Peace 
Centre (MPC) created to work towards a lasting peace. Part of the EU 
aid programmed for 2013 is to be devoted to peace processes, and 
insurgent ethnic groups have already received assistance to help 
them take part in ceasefire talks and political settlement negotiations.
The EU needs to rise above its traditional role as an aid donor and take 








The EU has long been the largest aid donor to uprooted peoples 
like the Rohingya refugees and Myanmar refugees in Thailand and 
Bangladesh. And now that development interventions in Myanmar 
are no longer limited by CFSP sanctions, the EU is right to use 
aid to support the reform process. But it also needs to rise above 
its traditional role as an aid donor and take on a more political 
role in order to avoid becoming a payer rather than a player. 
EU governments are exploring ways of supporting police reform 
in Myanmar that would build on past experience in security 
sector reform in Africa and the Balkans. The improved training of 
Myanmar’s police forces could reduce clashes with civilians and 
so mitigate the potential for escalation. The EU could also follow 
up on peace-related initiatives, particularly by sending conflict 
transformation advisors to co-operate with local actors on mediation 
efforts. European peace centres like the Berghof Centre for Conflict 
Transformation and the Peace Studies Department at Bradford 
University in the UK could do much to help the MPC’s work, and 
once peace agreements are in place the EU could support their 
implementation, building on its successful experience in Banda 
Aceh. This would fully cohere with the Comprehensive Framework’s 
objective of building capacity for all stakeholders and supporting 
credible measures aimed at reconciliation.
With a view to the Myanmar task force scheduled for November, 
the EU should take measures to fight the rampant corruption 
that is a major hindrance to Myanmar’s economic and political 
development. That departs from the EU’s traditional focus on human 
rights and democracy. And the EU should provide training for 
local officials, MPs, journalists and other civil society actors on the 
EU’s own workings, because Myanmar’s long isolation means that 
disinformation on the outside world is massive. Local elites need 
greater knowledge of the EU if they are to work with it and build 
effective partnerships. The EU needs to clarify what its role was 
during the sanctions period. In Zimbabwe, the EU became painfully 
aware of the loss of influence that resulted from its sanctions, and 
now it must become a much more visible actor in Myanmar. Q
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